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Legal Education and the Politics
of Exclusion
Richard A. Epstein*
I. THE FRAGILITY OF COMPETITION
In economic affairs the social advantages of competition are least appar-
ent to disappointed competitors. Domestic firms call for protection against
low price imports: Let there be tariffs and import quotas. Skilled workers
lobby for protection against low wage rivals: Let there be minimum wage
laws, maximum hours laws, and collective bargaining. Businesses work
overtime to keep out new rivals: Let there be exclusionary zoning and li-
censing. Pitted in opposition to these legislative fixes is a shrinking band of
market economists who celebrate the systematic gains that competition gen-
erates over its rival forms of social organization. The only protection that
anyone is entitled to have against economic competitors is to offer customers
lower prices or higher quality services. The disappointed competitor may
lose, but those private losses are more than matched by the vitality that is
given to the system as a whole. Persons who fail at one endeavor can pick
up the pieces, refine their act, shift their occupation, and try again.1 In the
wake of short-term competitive dislocations is a vigor that ripples its way
through the economic and social system.
The unending struggle between competition and protection also exists
within the academic setting. Here too the forces of exclusion have gathered
strength in recent years. The pressures, however, are not those of the usual
economic groups concerned with trade in standard goods and services.
Rather, these pressures stem from greater demands from women and mem-
bers of minority groups for increased position, voice, and influence inside the
academy. A generation ago, those groups appealed to the language of open
market competition for a more intensive role, underscoring the injustice of
passing over more qualified women and minority candidates because of their
race or sex. The charge was that universities in general, and law schools in
particular, were tight little islands dominated by a group of like-thinking
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This
paper was prepared for the Symposium on Legal and Civic Education sponsored by the Stanford
Law Review, March 4-6, 1993. I would like to thank Lloyd Cohen, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein
for their valuable criticisms and instructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Jay Wright
supplied his usual able research experience.
I. See Laura Mansnerus, Why Women Are Leaving the Law, WORKING WOMEN, Apr. 1993, at
64, on women lawyers who have abandoned, without regret, their legal careers to take other jobs,
usually with lower wages and higher personal satisfaction.
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individuals who, either consciously or unconsciously, excluded individuals
unlike themselves. Accordingly, the initial demand of women and minori-
ties was to remove barriers based on race and sex (or, as is usually said,
gender),2 so that appointments and promotions could be made on the
strength of individual merit and achievement, not on irrelevant personal
characteristics.
That first wave of changes to sweep over universities resulted in change
for the better. Any form of exclusion from the marketplace of ideas is to be
deplored, for the larger the potential pool of talent, the greater the strength
and vitality of academic institutions. However, no stable competitive equi-
librium occurred; the shift from open competition to new forms of prefer-
ence and exclusion has proceeded apace. Today's emphasis in appointments
and promotions is largely on results. Although no one should be so rash as
to claim that personnel issues are solely issues of race and sex, such consider-
ations loom very large indeed. Desperate rear guard maneuvers to insist
upon merit independent of race or sex are too often regarded as quaint or
evasive; lengthy explanations that extensive searches do not produce suitable
candidates are greeted with suspicion in all cases, and derision in some.
Scarcely a week goes by without a story in the New York Times addressing
the glacial rate of advancement of women and minorities in universities, and
always the numbers are said to tell much, if not all, of the story.3 Having
more women and minorities in academia is "progress" for the times, and
those institutions lagging behind-usually the most distinguished ones-are
2. The use of the word "sex," not "gender," should be construed as a modest political act. It is
meant to express my disagreement with the dominant views on the social and biological origins and
significance of sex differences. For an elaboration, see Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns; 41
DEPAUL L. REv. 981 (1992).
3. For one such claim, see Anthony DePalma, Rare in Ivy League: Women Who Work As Full
Professors, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1993, at Al. The story works on two levels. One is an account of
the position of Phoebe S. Leboy, chairman of the University of Pennsylvania Department of Bio-
chemistry in the Dental School, and its only woman member. The second is a numerical account of
the gender gap in hiring that shows that only 10% of full professors in the Ivy League Colleges are
women. There is no effort to compare the credentials of the best woman and the best man applicant
competing for any given position. Instead the story makes it appear as though only blind resistance
accounts for the absence of women in Ivy League ranks:
Then there is the pipeline argument, which says that universities would like to hire
more women but that candidates are simply not available. Out-of-work Ph.D.'s and a
whole generation of female scholars find that one argument hard to swallow, since women
receive 36 percent of the 38,000 doctorates conferred each year.
Id. at All.
Even if we put aside its know-it-all tone, the article does not account for the division of Ph.D.s
and jobs by field. A shortage of women or minorities in mathematics cannot be corrected by hiring
individuals with doctoral degrees in education or economics. The article fails to correct for any
quality differentials among Ph.D.s, regarding them as more or less fungible. It also fails to measure,
corrected by field, the number of male and female Ph.D. candidates that are hired relative to the
available pool. The clear implication is that the current imbalances are the result of unconscious
discrimination or hidebound attitudes. The only grudging concession DePalma makes is the obser-
vation that it takes time to correct these imbalances. Never~does he recognize the possibility that
reverse discrimination occurs within universities.
For a similar story on the paucity of women in theoretical economics, see Louis Uchitelie, In
Economics, a Subtle Exclusion, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1993, at Dl.
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condemned as inexcusable "backwaters." 4
The transformation from competition to exclusion never takes place
without some protective coloration. In and out of academic circles, those
seeking immunity from competition often assert some special reason for dis-
pensing with the general rule: Infant industries need protective tariffs; the
rural way of life requires farm subsidies; workers need protection from ex-
ploitation by giant corporations. In universities, the justification of race- or
gender-based preferences, goals, and quotas was once said to rest on the need
for affirmative action.
Today, however, this language has grown stale. The case for affirmative
action fits in best with the belief that some social steps should be taken to
correct some past, discrete wrong. To be sure, there is difficulty even in this
quarter, given that the remedy in question is often awarded against persons
who themselves were not wrongdoers. But even if one passes by that diffi-
culty, the age of explicit and overt discrimination against women and minor-
ities is now, largely, a generation past. There are few if any persons who can
credibly claim to be victims of overt discriminatory practices, as the formal,
institutional preferences run in the opposite direction. One might in princi-
ple seek to justify the pervasive level of explicit affirmative action, but it is
not possible to deny the extensive use of the practice.5 Affirmative action
also carries with it the gnawing implication that lower standards are used to
admit particular members to the faculty ranks, implicitly creating a second
class academic citizenry. No one wants to be introduced as an "affirmative
action colleague," and no one wants the dubious privilege of having to make
such an introduction.
The newer appeal to "diversity" avoids both of these potential embar-
rassments. No longer are present hiring preferences linked to past injustices;
no longer is there a question of lower standards. Instead, diversity projects a
far more positive image, claiming a more general appeal, by introducing new
academic views strengthening different perspectives on social problems and
increasing the vitality of discourse and debate.
So viewed, diversity is not merely a messy political compromise. Such
institutional justifications ease the sting of what is evident to all: that women
4. DePalma, supra note 3, at Al l.
5. There have been some studies, not in educational markets, that have sought to show that
various forms of discrimination still persist. Perhaps the most notable of these is Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991),
which has generated an enormous amount of publicity. Ayres relied on testers following standard-
ized bargaining strategies, not on real market prices. He also noted that his studies did not reveal
any form of intentional discrimination by race and sex. Indeed, his black male customers got their
best deals from white female sellers, as did black females from white male sellers. Id. at 841. I have
urged caution against the extrapolation of his results. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 51-54 (1992). For a second
round of debate, see Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Mar-
ket Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. (forthcoming 1994), and my response, Richard A. Epstein,
Standing Firm on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. (forthcoming 1994).
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and minorities are considered first,6 and others are asked to stand silently at
the back of the queue, in the teeth of an antidiscrimination statute that was
initially drafted with the opposite intention. 7
II. THE LAW SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT: THE STRUGGLE
OVER DISCOURSE
The battle over appointments and promotions is, however, only one por-
tion of the struggle for control of modem universities. One should pay equal
attention to the nature of academic inquiry and social discourse within the
university, for the change in the composition of university faculties has
brought with it strong pressures to reexamine the customary practices of
doing business. This is especially true in the humanities, the social sciences,
and of course, in the law, given the close connection between legal rules and
political power.
In dealing with the question of diversity, I shall direct my attention to
legal education, as it is the field I know best. In examining the dangers lurk-
ing beneath the surface appeal to diversity, I begin with a caveat: I do not
wish to defend or to restore each and every feature of the conventional style
of legal education from a substantive point of view. The days when a legal
curriculum could concentrate-exclusively or dominantly-on property,
contracts, torts, and other private law subjects is over. It will no longer do
to have in the curriculum one course on agency, another on partnerships, a
third on vendor and purchaser, a fourth on leases, a fifth on trusts, and a
sixth on mortgages, even if all these courses were staples in the legal curricu-
lum as recently as World War II.
This massive shift in emphasis from private towards public law may be
regrettable as a matter of first principle, but it is inescapable, and given the
current tenor of the times, probably irreversible. With the rise of the mod-
em welfare state comes an unavoidable shift in curricular emphasis. English
lawyers, in contrast, are not required to plumb the depths of political theory
to practice law. The cardinal principle of Parliamentary supremacy has
spared the House of Lords many of the political judgments that are routinely
made by our own Supreme Court. And as the courts go, so do the academ-
ics in their wake, devising theories equal to the enormous challenges posed
by cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.,8 Brown v. Board of
Education,9 and Roe v. Wade. 10 Each of these cases introduced major
changes in the structure of American law. Jones & Laughlin ratified the
6. The trend today seems to be to give preference to minorities over women when a second
order conflict arises.
7. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for any employer "to fail or refuse to hire...
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
8. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1610 [Vol. 45:1607
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massive expansion of the commerce clause; Brown forced an end to segrega-
tion in the South; Roe gave abortion constitutional protection. Whether
right or wrong, each gave rise to interpretive difficulties that required a rejec-
tion, or massive reinterpretation, of the traditional theories of interpretation
that rely either on plain meaning or original intention."
The consequences have been profound, not only for the shape of consti-
tutional law, but for the entire structure of legal discourse. As legal educa-
tion has become more far-reaching, approaches to it have drifted from their
narrower doctrinal roots. Academics now import principles from econom-
ics, political theory, sociology, history, and more recently from feminism
and critical race studies, so much so that some scholars wonder whether
anything is left to law as an autonomous discipline. 12
How does the current round of innovation in legal thought differ from
those preceding it? Principally, it has less to do with the new substantive
directions within the law, and more to do with the analytical presuppositions
and social attitudes that are brought to these substantive issues. The key
methodological feature shared by the new approaches is the denial that legal
knowledge is universally accessible to anyone choosing to acquire it.
Central to this position is the proposition that law is a study in which it is
possible to make intellectual progress in understanding the nature and oper-
ation of legal institutions and legal rules. To be sure, the exercise of political
power within a legal system has been and always will be part of rational
discourse. But the study of the determinants of individual and group behav-
ior is facilitated by such discourse, in accordance with general, universally
accessible principles. Indeed, the only long-term viable conception of a uni-
versity is one in which there is a single community of scholars searching for
an objective truth-modestly conceived and with a small "t"-that could be
understood, tested, challenged, and confirmed by scholars of all political
viewpoints and persuasions. To deny truth at this level is to insist that all
academic discourse is a disguised use of power. To insist on truth with a
capital "T" is to impose a rigid orthodoxy that will surely stifle intellectual
advances and the free inquiry on which such advances depend.
The position that I have taken here rests in large measure on my belief in
the universality and transferability of knowledge across both time and cul-
ture. My own studies of Roman law and English legal history persuade me
that the differences in values and structure across cultures are far less impor-
tant than might appear at first blush. The basic conceptions of property,
11. For some of the traditional literature, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.L 920 (1973) (on Roe); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946) (on the commerce clause); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 22-24 (1959) (on
Brown). The most recent case that has generated an outpouring of sentiment on constitutional inter-
pretation is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), but whatever the emotional intensity brought
to the case, it lacks the substantive importance of the three traditional staples of modem constitu-
tional law.
12. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962-1987, 100
HARv. L. REv. 761 (1987).
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both public and private, that are set out in the Institutes of Justinian,13 for
example, easily provide a legal foundation for speaking of the conceptions of
property developed by John Locke in the Second Treatise of Government.1 4
The similarities extend, I believe, beyond Western cultures steeped in both
the civil and the common law. At the most obvious level, the importation of
common law and civil law principles into Asian cultures has proceeded
apace well before the rise of modem multiculturalism. MacCauley was able
to draft an excellent code of criminal law in India in 1837.15 And the Japa-
nese looked to the German civil code as a model for their fundamental law. 16
Even on matters of customary law, the convergence across legal systems is
striking. The disputes over water law in Japan, for example, have a struc-
ture very much like those which took place in England and the United
States;17 whatever the cultural differences, the physical properties of water
are invariant across cultures. Robert Ellickson's recent comprehensive
study of property rights in land again illustrates the same point.', His work
includes "case studies of the land regimes at the Jamestown, Plymouth, and
Salt Lake settlements; Hutterite colonies and Israeli kibbutzim; Mexican
ejidos; and medieval open-field villages." 19
Across these cultures one general proposition holds that would warm the
heart of William Blackstone: Those regimes work best where those who sow
are entitled to reap. While this does not always point to a system of private
property within close-knit groups, 20 it does suggest that the external imposi-
tion of collective farms and similar institutions is an invariable recipe for
disaster, precisely because it ignores the culturally invariant relationship be-
tween output and incentive.21 Any comparative or historical study of legal
institutions that ignores these general relationships in an effort to invent
anew is asking to go astray.
The sense of cultural continuity is apparent in the political arena as well.
The rhetorical success of the Declaration of Independence during the convul-
sions of Eastern Europe illustrates that the articulation of certain principles
of political governance can transcend both time and culture, at least insofar
13. J. INST. ILl, in THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1883).
14. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-20 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (6th ed. 1764).
15. See INDIAN LAW COMMISSIONERS, A COPY OF THE PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE
INDIAN LAW COMMISSIONERS (Hertford, Stephen Austin 1851) (1837).
16. See 1 KTAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, at iii (1992).
17. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Water Law in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private Claims, and
Legal Convergence, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1989). Ramseyer was somewhat skeptical about the
convergence thesis, and was, rightly in my view, criticized for his caution in Carol M. Rose, Energy
and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 265, 293-
94 (1990).
18. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
19. Id. at 1319.
20. Id. at 1320.
21. Ellickson instances Stalin's collectives, Mao's great leap forward, and the collective
schemes of land ownership in Kampuchea and Ethiopia. Id. at 1318.
1612 [Vol. 45:1607
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as they deal with the central problem of the law: the reconciliation of polit-
ical power with individual liberty.
I have taught and lectured on legal issues across this country and over-
seas. In the process, I have encountered many individuals who strongly dis-
agreed with my positions on a variety of substantive issues. However, I have
never found that such objections, no matter how intense or telling, were de-
pendent on the special considerations of either a legal system or a social
culture that was inaccessible to outsiders. The nature of the discourse has
been surprisingly constant across institutional settings. It is important for us
all to acknowledge the ease with which knowledge is transmitted across ap-
parent cultural and social divides.
Given the nature of legal discourse, its academic objectives, and the pos-
sibilities of acquiring shared knowledge, it seems clear that no one should be
excluded from participation for reasons of race or sex, and that we should
exercise the utmost caution before giving anyone special preference, defer-
ence, or voice for those reasons. We should not relive our past institutional
mistakes. The earlier history of American legal institutions was marked by
patterns of exclusion: Blacks, Jews, women, and recent immigrants to the
United States were systematically and overtly denied positions as students
and faculty members. Such patterns of behavior are indefensible, even if (as
I believe) the state should play no role in shaping the internal rules of univer-
sities and other private institutions.22 Open discourse, open competition,
and open debate should prevail.
Now, paradoxically, as the doors of universities are opened wider than
ever before, the opposite process has started to creep in. Over and over
again, within the university there is an effort to first divide intellectual in-
quiry, and then human knowledge, such that certain members of academia
are ineligible to participate in the common discourse, at least on matters
regarding two of the most explosive issues of our time, race and sex. There
is, of course, something of an irony here. Any effort to develop a set of
public and coercive norms instructing private institutions whom they should
hire, whom they should serve, or how their internal constitutions should be
organized often backfires in painful illustration of the general principle of
unintended consequences. 23
Matters of race, ethnicity, or sexual identification are so strong and so
powerful that it is almost fruitless for the legal system to endeavor to stamp
these impulses out. However, any appeal to X-blind principles will be selec-
tive and skewed. One cannot discriminate against me because of some uni-
versal norm, yet the norm does not preclude similar discrimination in my
favor. Certain preferences will be ruled out of bounds; others will be exalted
22. For the most open attack, see EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 5.
23. See ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 115-16 (rev. ed.
1968), referring to what has become known as the unanticipated consequences of purposive social
action. The antidiscrimination laws qualify in this regard because, by their two-sided interpretation,
they induce some firms to engage in discrimination in favor of protected classes in order to avoid
charges of discrimination against persons from these same groups.
July 1993] 1613
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as necessary truths.24 Old beliefs, whether true or false, will be dismissed as
irrelevant shibboleths, and a new orthodoxy will emerge that proves every
bit as intolerant as the one it replaces. Sooner or later, someone will peek
out from behind the veil of ignorance and observe that certain traits are
preferred or protected, leaving others to the mercy of the public institutions
arrayed against them. The law is a blunt instrument that overwhelms more
subtle forms of social control.
III. ExTERNAL LAW VERSUS INTERNAL GOVERNANCE
With all this said, I do not think that the same rules should apply to
private institutions as apply to their publicly administered counterparts. It
is not the job of the legal system to question whether certain conduct is or is
not desirable. Rather, its task is to determine whether such conduct is so
undesirable that public force should be directed against it, notwithstanding
the dangers of increased state power. Conversely, the inquiry faced by any
law school, university, or indeed any private institution, is quite different:
How do we choose to govern ourselves? The principle of autonomy gives no
clues about how to answer this question of internal choice, or how these
institutions should be organized. All too often, the academic response to
any hard question of appropriate conduct is to suggest that it be left to the
market, but in this instance, lawyers and law professors are not in their ha-
bitual position of seeking to regulate the conduct of others. As members of
faculties, they constitute "the market," and it is their job to find the set of
rules that should govern the internal life of the institutions to which they
belong.
To recognize that these institutions should have the benefit of a principle
of freedom of association against the external world is not to instruct them
how to use their power for matters that should, or do, fall within their exclu-
sive jurisdiction. Indeed, one reason for abandoning state antidiscrimination
laws is that private institutions have a comparative advantage in preventing
or minimizing asocial and destructive sorts of behavior. Stated otherwise, if
there is an evil from discrimination that can be detected by those who en-
force the law, then that evil can also be detected and controlled by those who
operate law schools and universities at large. There are a thousand different
ways that one might choose to deal with the question of discrimination.
24. For example, Richard Delgado has suggested that facially neutral or meritocratic rules,
because they predictably handicap blacks, are insufficient tools for fighting so-called "procedural"
discrimination:
Realizing that racism has these different guises [both substantive and procedural] explains
much of the gulf between Kennedy and myself... He detests (as do I) intentional favorit-
ism based on race: If a white is given a benefit over an equally or more deserving black,
Kennedy is quick to condemn it.
Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95, 106
(1990).
Note that the universal principle illustrated is discrimination against blacks. One wonders
whether Delgado "detests" discrimination against whites. Or do contingent social circumstances
again justify this deviation from a universal moral rule?
[Vol. 45:16071614
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Why complicate matters with a set of external coercive practices that could
well make matters worse than before? The mere introduction of a govern-
ment program introduces a set of high administrative costs that need not be
borne where the program is done on a voluntary basis. And it imposes a
heavy straightjacket, so that all institutions of the same class are driven to
adopt the same form of affirmative action, regardless of the distinctive differ-
ences in their own positions. We should not expect a law school located in
the South to have the same percentage of Latino students as those located in
the Southwest. And we should not expect to see the same type of affirmative
action program in a physics department as we find in a Law School or hu-
manities program. Government officials are typically insensitive to these
variations; the same is likely to prove true of accrediting agencies that now
treat programs of this sort as relevant to the accreditation process. 25
The question then remains, why might a law school or a university adopt
some general X-blind norm with respect to its ordinary activities? There is
no universal answer here. For instance, religious institutions may well think
that adherence to their beliefs is a necessary predicate for teaching and stud-
ying them. I fully endorse that right, even though I may disagree strongly
with their particular beliefs. In the end, however, no academic institution
that adopts such a position will reach the first rank, at least on those topics
posing a genuine conflict between fixed dogma and freedom of inquiry. One
enduring advantage of the secular university is that it is spared the task of
mediating between demands for loyalty and demands for open exchange.
The job of creating or finding new knowledge is never an easy one. It
takes the ablest of individuals to generate and to verify ideas that no one else
has thought of before. The accumulation of knowledge, moreover, has both
individual and collective dimensions: No academic can prosper in an envi-
ronment that is unreceptive to new arguments, evidence, or ideas. The best
faculties and the ablest students must constantly test their ideas against each
other, learning both from the insights of others and from their own mistakes.
The scholar who flees from risk, or ducks competition in ideas, will quickly
fall by the wayside, much like a heavyweight boxer whose skills atrophy
because he enters the ring only against weaker opponents. Only those who
are prepared to take the risk of embarrassment will be able to make, alone or
with others, the bold leaps necessary for intellectual advance. The road to
personal success and intellectual achievement is not the path of caution.
Any scholar worth her salt has to be prepared to take on the world. One
cannot do that by following a practice of exclusion or preference that saps
law schools, and the universities to which they belong, of their ablest mem-
bers. The open university or law school is the surest way to secure the great-
est intellectual advances. The mission of a university is to set a stage on
which all players may strut and fret; it is an impresario, not an advocate.
25. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, Bylaws § 6-4 & Executive Committee
Regulations § 6.19, in 1993 HANDBOOK.
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But it can do that job only when no one is excluded from playing, and only if
no substantive position is ruled out of bounds a priori.
Another way to describe this position is to say that the university should
foster a system of internal competition, thus producing advantages in the
marketplace for ideas similar to those in the competitive marketplace for
goods. There are many producers and consumers of ideas, and there is no
central authority matching this producer with that consumer. Each is al-
lowed to search for the best partner on the other side of the market, and
those ideas with greater support will flourish. To be sure, novel ideas are
likely to run into stiff resistance in the short-term, and even the soundest of
conceptions may begin life as an unwanted or derided orphan. However, the
genius of the competitive system is that a single determined individual need
not knuckle under to the better judgment of his or her colleagues, and may,
at the risk of shipwreck, continue to sail on alone until success is obtained, if
it is to be obtained at all. There is no requirement that any idea or position
be accepted by a majority of a relevant class of experts. Diversity of posi-
tions is assured by the stubbornness and creativity of individual actors on the
academic stage. It is not orchestrated by senior administrators or currently
popular scholars. The constant threat of new entry keeps all scholars on
their toes. Entrants can gain recognition and fame by dislodging established
ideas or extending old ones to novel circumstances; established scholars can
show that their ideas withstand the barrage of the next generation or incor-
porate the best that these new ideas have to offer. No one has a vested right
to loyalty, affection, or respect from the remainder of the academic profes-
sion, just as no seller in a market is guaranteed a market share in the face of
new entry and persistent competition.
This ideal of a university has eroded significantly in recent years. The
market for ideas has become increasingly compartmentalized, so that some
of us are not, quite literally, allowed to trespass in fields occupied by others.
It is not uncommon for scholars to claim that their positions should be im-
mune to criticism by persons outside their experiential circles; for such per-
sons do not possess the special insights and understanding that are necessary
to deal with the issues in question. On matters of race and gender especially,
this tendency for exclusion is very strong.
It is important to understand the arguments that are used to rationalize
this practice, and why they are not only wrong, but wholly antithetical to the
academic mission.26 The first such argument is a plea for deference based on
the unique experiences and knowledge that women and minority members
bring to the academic community. The second is an insistence that victimi-
zation and subordination are routine features of the academic order. The
third is a demand to limit the ability of scholars to make statements that
others regard as insensitive or offensive. In each case, the intent is the same:
26. The literature here is large and often tendentious. See, eg., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New
Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidis-
crimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
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to create a monopoly over discourse and debate on some set of critical issues.
Thus, the tension between competition and rent-seeking behavior is not con-
fined to economic affairs.27 It flourishes today in the world of ideas.
A. Experience
One source of exclusivity is an attempt to redefine the relationship be-
tween experience and knowledge. Under the traditional view, there is the
class of necessary truths, but these are concerned with mathematical ideas,
syllogisms, and definitions. In and of themselves, they tell us little about the
external world, even though they supply the analytical tools and the concep-
tual framework that are indispensable for understanding the world that lies
beyond their ken. Once sharpened, these tools must be applied to data that
is gained through a combination of observation, testing, and critical intelli-
gence about some natural or social phenomenon. By insisting that knowl-
edge is acquired through experience, classical philosophers understood the
limits of pure deductive reasoning: Nothing could be found in the conclu-
sion that was not already contained in the premises.28 Human experience
gave the link to the external world.
An integral component of the role of experience, however, was that all
human experience mattered. There was no hint of exclusion. The power of
language and science was that experiential information could be understood
by all. Granted, differences in background and experience may well lead
persons to have singular insights or observations about the external world;
but the motivation whereby they obtained information about the world had
little to do with the verification of the information they obtained, which itself
could be checked through neutral processes and compared with the observa-
tions and theories of others in the relevant field. 29 The heuristics and biases
of various persons could only enrich the scope of knowledge by opening up a
set of analogies and experiments that no one person, however insightful or
clever, could develop alone. In short, it was possible to have separate and
idiosyncratic ways of acquiring the truth while having universal means for
understanding and verifying what constituted that truth.30 The diversity of
27. For a discussion of the issues thus raised, see TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980).
28. See DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 233-374 (T. H. Green & T. H. Grose
eds., New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1898).
29. The force of these lessons was impressed on me by my own great teacher, Ernest Nagel.
See generally ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 547-606 (1961) (analyzing potential
obstacles to the objective reporting of history); Ernest Nagel, The Logic of Historical Analysis, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN OUR TIME 203 (Hans Meyerhoff ed., 1959).
30. See MERTON, supra note 23, at 607 (footnote omitted):
Universalism finds immediate expression in the canon that truth claims, whatever
their source, are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria: consonant with ob-
servation and with previously confirmed knowledge. The acceptance or rejection of claims
entering the lists of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their
protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class and personal qualities are as such irrele-
vant. Objectivity precludes particularism. The circumstance that scientifically verified for-
mulations refer to objective sequences and correlations militates against all efforts to
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perspectives therefore enriched the dialogue and showed the strength of
open competition.
In the modem world of race and gender studies, this conception is re-
garded as wholly alien to the all important social inquiries. The thought
that principles of verification can be neutral and universal has been replaced
by a notion that truths, like people, are socially situated and constructed.
Persons not possessing the requisite set of personal experiences are thought
to be outside the loop: While they might be able to understand what insiders
know or feel, they can never exercise independent intelligence to decide
whether a claim is true or false. If one wants to understand what is meant
by oppression, indignity, brutality or indifference, the argument goes, then
one must be the victim of those experiences, or at least share the same race
or sex of those who are. A statement of Mari Matsuda illustrates this
position:
This article suggests that those who have experienced discrimination speak
with a special voice to which we should listen. Looking to the bottom-
adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the
liberal promise-can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phe-
nomenology of law and defining the elements of justice.31
This brief passage reveals much of what is wrong with modem critical
race theory. It begins with a plea that "we" should listen to those who speak
with a "special voice." Yet by the next sentence, the "we" becomes "critical
scholars," not the general community of academics. The knowledge that the
disadvantaged possess is obtained by experience, but it is apparently immune
to cross-examination, for "the falsity of the liberal premise" is something
that they have "seen and felt" and thus rises by assumption to the status of a
self-evident certitude beyond challenge by outsiders, even those who started
at the bottom and may have risen by dint of hard work. Finally, even the
task of "defining justice" appears to be one that falls to the critical scholars,
as if the rest of us are unable to add anything of moment to the debate.
Matsuda's passage also appears to reject the possibility of intelligent em-
pathy, whereby one can think creatively about her own experiences to imag-
impose particularistic criteria of validity. The Haber process cannot be invalidated by a
Nuremberg decree nor can an Anglophobe repeal the law of gravitation....
However, the institution of science is but part of a larger social structure with which it
is not always integrated. When the larger culture opposes universalism, the ethos of sci-
ence is subjected to serious strain. Ethnocentrism is not compatible with universalism.
Merton first wrote these words in 1942. It is a sad commentary on today's scholarship that so
great a thinker in the history of social thought is now taken to task for his effort "to perpetuate white
male hegemony of social institutions." Johnson, supra note 26, at 2017 n.41; see also Gary Peller,
Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 778 (attacking the appeal to objectivity as a crude device
"to help justify racial domination-if not to its victim, then at least to white beneficiaries who need
to believe that their social positions are the result of something more than the brute fact of social
power and racial domination"). It is unfortunate that a conscious appeal to universalism and to
respecting all others is now taken as a sign of particularism and exclusion.
31. Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 323, 324 (1987).
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ine the predicament of others.32 It suggests that those without first-hand
experience can neither discuss its implications nor evaluate the various pro-
posals that are designed to correct whatever imbalances are perceived.
Thus, people like myself who were lucky to grow up in privileged family
circumstances cannot even rely on their own observation of other individuals
and other communities to advance their own understanding or persuade
others. There is, in short, a sustained effort to exclude outsiders from the
debate, allowing only those with preferred wisdom and insight to enter a
social discourse.
Forms of scholarship such as Matusda's are but one form of attack on
the traditional aspiration to universal knowledge. So too, I believe, is the
rise of narrative accounts by feminist and critical race scholars, of which
Professor Delgado's contribution to this symposium is typical. 33 In narra-
tive, the address is personal and literary. The characters are of the author's
own invention and can be easily endowed with whatever strengths and weak-
nesses best serve to advance the tale. The use of this art form cuts out any
appeal to quantitative data or general theory, and is always congenial to
strong expressions of personal belief. Because narrative adopts the perspec-
tive and voice of a single author, it cannot be easily refuted by the usual
forms of social science evidence. Other authors have different voices and
perspectives, and there is no contradiction between the proposition that "A
believes X," and "B believes not-X," even if there is a contradiction between
X and not-X. The author can hint that in his view the narrative does express
some larger truth entitled to respect in its own right. Yet by the same token,
his narrative does not lend itself to refutation by the forms of evidence and
argument that can be raised against more traditional forms of scholarly dis-
cussion. When the going gets tough, the narrative becomes an art form, an
exercise of literary imagination. When the waters are calm, it is transformed
into an idealized account of a widespread social problem. Either way, the
narrative adds its strength to the politics of exclusion by presenting a moving
target to more traditional practitioners of the academic art.
The dangers of such an exclusionary approach should be apparent to all,
but too often they are not. The most important questions of race and sex
generally do not concern intragroup relationships. Rather, they address the
relationships between persons of different groups: men and women, black
and white, and so on. One cannot consider rape to be strictly a woman's
question when the rapist is male and when the rules governing the crime of
rape affect men who act with honorable intentions as well as those who do
not. Indeed, on the critical question of consent to charges of rape, no com-
plete account can ignore the behavior and perceptions of both individuals,
32. The classical examination of this subject is still ADAM SMITH, A THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (n.p. 1759).
33. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of De-
nial, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1581 (1993). This piece is a continuation of Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992).
July 1993] 1619
HeinOnline  -- 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1619 1992-1993
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
especially when miscommunications can easily arise.34 Similarly, in dealing
with issues such as the distribution of voting rights, the control of criminal
and civil juries, or the operation of harassment or discrimination, interac-
tions take place between persons of all races and both sexes. If one assumes
that only those with unique experiences can participate in the dialogue, then
no one can speak with intelligence about these issues; for each of us possess
only partial knowledge, leaving open the possibility of both error and bias.
Only by admitting all interested persons into the academic discourse can we
mitigate the inaccuracies caused by this sampling bias.
Furthermore, exclusionary practices can lead to a fragmentation of the
political system. Many people now have strong and enduring reasons to dis-
trust the opinions of others solely for reasons of their race, religion, ethnic
origin and the like.
No matter how it is sliced, any exclusionary system has to lead to a skep-
ticism that is inimical to the central academic mission of any university or
law school. If each side can claim the uniqueness of its own insights, then
there is no way to broker differences among persons who come from differ-
ent backgrounds or begin with different beliefs. The form of relativism that
allows for the special dignity of the black experience or the female experi-
ence makes it impossible to explain to skeptical outsiders why those insights
should command special respect. Moreover, this philosophical approach im-
plies that every narrative-including that of the white male, or even the
fringe lunatic-should be exempt from outside scrutiny. But no one is enti-
tled to the comfort of a risk-free position in public discourse. The diversity
of experience and the distinctiveness of perceptions is both an opportunity
for understanding and an obstacle to it. Nevertheless, the usual require-
ments of coherence in argument, articulation of theory, and the marshalling
and evaluation of evidence must remain intact if the academic mission of a
university or law school is to be fulfilled.
B. False Consciousness and Subordination
The impulse to exclude in academic settings is reinforced by yet another
set of dubious philosophical presuppositions. All too often, we are told that
on matters of sex and race (or some combination thereof), dominance and
subordination are operative principles in practice.35 Accordingly, persons
who accept the status quo in any particular case are subject to a false con-
34. One might wonder why problems of date and acquaintance rape seem so much more preva-
lent today. Part of the reason must be the greater willingness of women to speak about these
problems when they do arise. But part of the explanation may lie in the increased frequency of
ambiguous social signals. For example, the greater social acceptance of short-term sexual relation-
ships creates the potential for misunderstanding, which was absent in an earlier age of stricter exter-
nal sexual norms. Previously, sexual advances within a dating arrangement were easier to treat as
falling outside the social contract than they are today.
35. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 240-42
(1989); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections of Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1291 (1991) (speaking of the double disadvantage faced by black women who are neither white
nor male).
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sciousness because they are so blinded by the dominant norms, given the
current distribution of power and privilege within an inherently unjust soci-
ety. Therefore, for women or minorities to say that they are content with the
status quo (whatever it may be) is conclusive proof of their own inadequacy.
The only persons who would make such foolish statements are those whose
subordinated positions obscure their real interests. The unstated premise of
this view is that anyone with a clear sense of the current social arrangements
would know that they are unjust; any who demur are captives to the very
system that they ought to condemn and criticize.
This position is troublesome for a number of reasons. First, it adopts a
presumption that no one should be able to bring to moral or political argu-
ment: that those who make radical critiques of the current structure have
successfully broken the gravitational pull of an evil and corrupt system, and
therefore deserve praise for their independence of mind and acuity of
thought. Conversely, those who take the opposite position lack both the
moral courage and the intellectual insight to reach a sound position. Claims
of subordination are therefore nonfalsifiable. To challenge the doctrine is
once again to fall prey to its power. The rhetoric of subordination thus rein-
forces the sharp division within academic territory by excluding from dis-
course anyone who concurs with the status quo. The more fervently one
argues on behalf of the current social structure, the more evident it is that
she accepts today's unjust arrangements of dominance, hierarchy, and
patriarchy.
No balanced account should be so dismissive of the status quo. Institu-
tions that have survived the test of time may not be perfect, but they may
well contain hidden advantages that prove very important in practice, even if
they are hard to identify in theory. While this generalization does nothing to
justify slavery, it provides persuasive evidence that certain forms of consen-
sual arrangements, whether in marriage or in markets, generate substantial
gains for the parties that participate in them. It is regrettable that feminists
and critical race scholars, who are so suspicious of market arrangements,
should exhibit so strong an allegiance to socialism and various forms of col-
lective ownership as one apparent avenue of escape from the travail of
subordination.
Yet it should not be supposed that subordination is without advantages
to the subordinated, particularly in the modem realm of learned discourse.
Those who claim to have overcome subordination are free to enter a privi-
leged debate from which the rest of us are excluded. But too often, real
dialogue fails to materialize. Little is so placid as a debate among the vari-
ous strands of feminism, as demonstrated by the initial panel presentation at
this conference.a6 Within feminist theory, there is a deep cleavage between
radical and cultural feminists over the nature and the source of differences
36. The panel members were Margaret Jane Radin, Judith Resnik, Deborah Rhode, and Susan
Williams, and the moderator was Susan Okin. For some of the panelists' contributions, see Judith
Resnik, Ambivalence: The Resiliency of Legal Culture in the United States, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1525
(1993); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on LegalEducation, 45 STAN. L.
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between women and men.37 It is quite possible for feminists to have a spir-
ited debate about whether these differences are biologically determined or
socially constructed.38 They might also differ over whether special laws
should be passed to take into account the natural differences between men
and women, or whether women have some natural superiority because of
their greater intuitive sympathy and appreciation of the situation of others.
But this is a debate that men should enter only at their peril.39
Also excluded (and even excoriated) are women who refer to the sociol-
ogy or psychology of differences. 40 The sociobiology of gender as applied to
occupational choices should only be discussed in polite company.41 To urge
that natural differences in aggressive behavior may account for occupational
choice and occupational success is to invite ridicule.42 Here again, the de-
bate is closed to one group, along with any conclusions that such a group
might contribute. Any debate on such skewed terms is sure to lead to incor-
rect conclusions, both on matters of description and policy.
C. Sensitivity
The third element that contributes to the sense of separation among legal
scholars is the expanded conception of harm used to assess the behavior of
participants in public discourse. Many will argue that harm in this context
does not refer simply to broken bones and broken promises. It refers as well
to the offense people take at certain forms of behavior and at the articulation
of certain ideas by others. It is thus important to ask what respect, if any,
REv. 1547 (1993). For a transcript of panelists' question and answer discussions, see Discussion, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1993).
37. See generally Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987) (arguing that gender differences stem primarily from structural
norms); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988) (arguing that biologi-
cal factors contribute to gender differences); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 797 (1989) (arguing that gender differences arise from differing methods of assimilation).
38. See, eg., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WO-
MEN'S DEVELOPMENT 2 (1982) (arguing that social construction is the basis for the difference be-
tween the male and female perspective).
39. I have cheerfully done so, however, with biological overtones. See Epstein, supra note 2.
40. See, eg., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 307 (7th Cir. 1988) (female expert
witness testified that women avoided commission sales positions due to a difference in preferences).
Rosalind Rosenberg, the Sears expert witness who testified, has since been subjected to savage treat-
ment by other women. For an account, see Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic Free-
dom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1629, 1630-32 (1988).
For the reply, see Alice Kessler-Harris, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: A Response to
Heskell and Levinson, 67 TEX. L. REV. 429 (1988). And for the rejoinder, see Thomas Haskell &
Sanford Levinson, On Academic Freedom and Hypothetical Pools: A Reply to Alice Kessler-Harris, 67
TEX. L. REV. 1591 (1989). Is there any reason to expect that an expert witness who used the
feminist theory of differences to justify stricter enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws would be
subject to such abuse?
41. Richard A. Epstein, The Varieties of Self-Interest, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 102 (1990).
42. For examples of such ridicule, see the replies to Epstein, supra note 2, in Kathryn Abrams,
Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1021 (1992); David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1007 (1992); and my reply, Richard A. Epstein, The Authoritarian Impulse in Sex
Discrimination Law: A Reply to Professors Abrams and Strauss, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1041 (1992).
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private institutions should pay to bruised feelings and offended sensibilities.
The ambiguity of these terms further complicates the basic inquiry.
Over and over again we are told that it is important to be "sensitive"
about behavior on the delicate subjects of race and sex. Yet to say that
someone is sensitive is to say one of two quite different things. On the one
hand, it is surely a virtue to be sensitive to the feelings of others when deal-
ing with them. Ceteris paribus, persons who display this form of sensitivity
make the world a more pleasant place for those around them, and the de-
mand for their time, company, and, services should accordingly increase.
However, there is a second sense to the word "sensitive" that rightly
enjoys a negative connotation. Some individuals are too sensitive in that
they place the worst interpretation possible on the words and actions of
others. By being so sensitive to language with which they do not agree (as in
the constant battles over the proper mix of "he and she"), they make it
harder for others to place substance before form. Instead of expanding the
circle of comfort for other persons, they narrow it; they create conflict and
confrontation when a more oblivious attitude toward minor slights could
keep matters on an even keel. An unfortunate characteristic of the modem
feminist and black movements is that they use their own exquisite sensibili-
ties to impose harsh rules of conduct on others who do not share their
beliefs.
Here turnabout is not always regarded as fair play. Brutal assertions
that others are racist, sexist, homophobic, heterosexist, ageist, etc. are re-
garded as necessary outbursts of candor, startling a complacent majority out
of its dogmatic slumber. Increasingly, this license with language has taken a
far uglier turn that in time may work itself back into university life. Recent
years have brought an increase in use of such terms as "queer" and "nigger"
by gay and black groups so confident of their own position that they regard
shock therapy as an appropriate form of discourse.43 This form of shock
therapy is also common in branches of feminist scholarship which believe
that the most harrowing narratives are the only way to shock the rest of us
free from complacency. 44
In legal education as elsewhere, it is impossible for a mutual dialogue to
exist when one side labors under powerful verbal constraints while the other
side has free-rein to express its sentiments in harsh and condemnatory lan-
guage. The familiar reference to "dead, white, European males" or, as is
said in some law schools "fungible, white males," involves the worst form of
type-casting, stereotyping, and condescension imaginable, inappropriately
lumping together persons of vastly different personal backgrounds, traits and
intellectual temperaments. Distinguished writers and scholars who repre-
sent widely different methodologies and beliefs are summarily dismissed
43. Michael Marriott, Rap's Embrace of 'Nigger' Fires Bitter Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24,
1993, at Al.
44. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WO-
MEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (illustrating her argument for the need for sex dis-
crimination law with case studies).
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from the realm of serious or respectable discourse. It is indeed ironic that
strong critics of racial, sexual, and ethnic stereotypes often resort to the
same practices they have found so hurtful in others.
It may be said that leeway should be given members of disadvantaged
groups because white males, given their dominant position, are so hardy that
insults do not inflict the same kind of psychological harms. As a psychologi-
cal truth this is doubtful, but, whether true or false, it overlooks the grave
institutional risks that occur when rules of common civility do not apply to
all members of public debate. It is very difficult to fashion a set of social
practices that adequately avoids excessive sensitivity to one's own personal
feelings, while at the same time avoiding excessive indifference to the feelings
of others. The effort to allow for dual standards of conduct based on the
different social positions of parties to a debate is surely a recipe for disaster.
One of the central contentions of the ongoing debate about subordination
asks where the relative advantage is-and here the consistent decline in
white male wages relative to the rest of the population in the past decade or
so leaves that question very much in doubt.45 It is an act of political foolish-
ness to fashion the basic rules of discourse on the assumption that one side of
the discussion is known to be correct before the debate itself begins. And it
would be a task of pointless complexity to seek to create different rules of
speech for different groups and to peg their respective privileges to their cur-
rent success in the ongoing social revolution.
IV. AND FOR WHAT?
The modern preoccupation with diversity has led to an excessive concern
about matters of race and sex. Certainly within the legal community, the
question of diversity has moved from being one consideration among many
to a place of unquestioned dominance in university and law school life. Yet
out of this diversity has come little insight as to what parts of legal and social
life warrant further study. One instructive litmus test is to ask what the
champions of law school diversity contribute to the intellectual study of law
(or indeed any other discipline) on matters that have little or nothing to do
with race or sex. Can the ardent feminist or critical race theorist say some-
thing, anything, about copyrights, patents, or trademarks? About bank-
ruptcy, secured transactions, or reorganizations? About income, estates, or
corporate tax? About contracts, property, or torts?
It is, of course, always possible to say that the applicable legal doctrines
are so infected by hierarchy that any notions of corrective justice, efficiency,
or participation are but disguised rationalizations of the status quo. One
great advantage of such critiques is that they can be uttered with complete
conviction, without bothering to distinguish between a nonrecognition ex-
change and a voidable preference. But even specific critiques that do rest on
detailed knowledge of a substantive field must meet this challenge. For ex-
45. See The Fourteenth Annual Salary Survey, WORKING WOMAN, Jan. 1993, at 39, 40, 43.
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ample, assume that there is a dispute between two (or more) people of the
same race or the same sex and that a rule must allocate competing legal
rights between them. Now identify the rules that allow these disputes to be
resolved in a fashion acceptable to both sides. Are they different from those
which would be adopted in a dispute between black and white, between male
and female? If they are, then in what regard and why? Should we use strict
liability between men, and negligence between women, or vice versa? Is effi-
ciency, fairness, or participation a virtue that some understand but that
others do not? At this point, strong critiques of the established doctrines
lose their persuasive power. The dialogue that follows these questions will
be one, I am confident, that retraces the steps of traditional civil and com-
mon law scholars: What is the relationship between justice, efficiency, util-
ity, and participation? If such a dialogue is pertinent to persons within the
same group, then why does it no longer apply to disputes between members
of different groups?
In making these observations, I am not claiming that sex differences do
not matter in the operation of the market economy. But it is critical to un-
derstand how they matter. For example, in one recent effort, Carol Rose
attempts to show that women's strategies of bargaining cooperatively help
explain the wage gap between men and women.46 Her point is that men
obtain a larger share of the cooperative surplus because of their more aggres-
sive strategies. I believe that she is wrong in that she ignores the frequency
that men and women with different bargaining strategies are likely to enter
into gainful arrangements in the first place.47 For these purposes it does not
matter who is correct. Both her basic argument and my response rely on
orthodox neoclassical economics. Even if Rose's efforts to link contracting
practices to general wage differentials fail, it is highly likely that differences
in contracting attitudes between men and women may influence their market
behavior. For example, the cost of enforcement may be lower within groups
than across them, reducing the likelihood of inter-group relational contracts.
But that result is generated by the orthodox view of transaction cost eco-
nomics-one that helps identify some of the costs of universally enforced
antidiscrimination principles.48 What is needed is a distinctive contribution
that helps explain phenomena that cannot be accounted for by the ordinary
rules of discourse as applied to the problems of race and sex.
It is important to anticipate one objection. It may well be that feminists
themselves acknowledge that they have little to say about vast areas of com-
mercial law and taxation, and that their intellectual contributions come into
their own when they address issues closer to the relationships between men
and women. But even here, most of what is done is flawed by its failure to
acknowledge, let alone apply, some of the basic principles of markets and
46. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421
(1992).
47. See Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on the Gender Gap in Employment, - GEO. L.J.
- (forthcoming 1993).
48. See EPmEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 5, at 59-78.
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exchange. An illustrative example is the cultural feminist treatment of
mandatory family leave legislation. It has been suggested that Carol Gilli-
gan's account of the differences between men and women's voices49 argues in
favor of such a bill.50 Even if Gilligan's account of sex differences makes
sense, it provides no guidance as to who, if anyone, should subsidize this
endeavor. Such subsidies are justified only in the presence of a market fail-
ure and the existence of external benefits. Accordingly, one must show that
private contracting parties are unable to give leave to women (or men) when-
ever the gain to the employee exceeds the cost to the employer. A legislative
solution requires us to believe that a uniform rule is preferable, even when
the costs of leave may be far greater in some contexts than in others. Such
an approach ignores the decisive advantage of a market solution: that legis-
lation inefficiently provides family leave to all, regardless of how people
value the benefit.
Even if I have mistaken the correct analysis of the family leave bill, the
question remains whether a feminist approach to the subject generates in-
sights that more conventional approaches miss. Here I am hard pressed to
think of what it offers apart from a vivid account of why some women (and
some men) strongly support the legislation. But the novel insights that
might justify it are lacking. The same might be said of many other innova-
tions attributable to feminist theory.
The final conclusion is, I think, a sobering one. The modern academic
discourses of critical theory and new voices have thus far contributed noth-
ing to the debate on substantive legal issues beyond the constant, repetitive
assertion of their own relevance. Even on the issues most relevant to their
own concerns, they lack the basic conceptual apparatus necessary for under-
standing. What we have are merely assertions that theirs is a large turf that
outsiders may not share. What is needed is not another exhortation about
the unique perspective that individuals from certain groups bring to the
study of law. What is needed is not another effort to exclude outsiders from
discourse. What is needed is delivery on the promise that persons of differ-
ent backgrounds can develop distinctive methodologies in order to make
contributions that enrich our common legal culture. How long will we have
to wait?
49. Gilligan's basic argument is that women seek intuitive connection and relationships, while
men seek the status of self-contained individuals. GILLIGAN, supra note 38, at 35, 62-63.
50. For instance, consider the following excerpt from Linda Lacey:
Cultural feminists draw upon Gilligan's work to describe women's "voice" in legal
analysis as well as life experiences. Women's voices, they assert, emphasize positive values
such as caring, nurturing, and empathy instead of competition, aggressiveness, and selfish-
ness. Women intuitively seek connection and relationships, while men struggle for autono-
mous individualism. In more concrete terms, cultural feminists advocate a recognition of
women's contributions to society, such as child-raising or care-giving. A great deal of their
work emphasizes the need for laws such as mandatory child-raising leaves which will en-
courage these activities.
Linda J. Lacey, Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma's Seduction Statute,
25 TuLSA L.J. 775, 786 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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